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In Difference and Repetition, Gilles Deleuze outlines a theory of ideas as problems, existent on the level 
of a virtuality distinct from, but irreducibly related to, that of their incarnation in a variety of specifically 
constituted theoretical domains: 
Following Lautman and Vuillemin’s work on mathematics, ‘structuralism’ seems to us the only 
means by which a genetic method can achieve its ambitions.  It is sufficient to understand that 
the genesis takes place not between one actual term, however small, and another actual term in 
time, but between the virtual and its actualisation – in other words, it goes from the structure to 
its incarnation, from the conditions of a problem to the cases of solution, from the differential 
elements and their ideal connections to actual terms and diverse real relations which constitute 
at each moment the actuality of time.  This is a genesis without dynamism, evolving necessarily 
in the element of a supra-historicity, a static genesis which may be understood as the correlate 
of the notion of passive synthesis, and which in turn illuminates that notion.1  
Deleuze’s identification of ideas with problems is adopted, in part, from the novel synthesis proposed by 
the mathematical philosopher Albert Lautman in a series of essays of the 1930s and 40s, between an 
unorthodox but textually-grounded Platonism and the mathematics of his time.2 Deleuze takes 
Lautman’s work to provide at least partial means for a reconciliation of structure and genesis, so that an 
account of the virtual structure of an idea-problem can at the same time, and without irreducible 
tension, function as an account of its real genesis in a specific, concrete domain.   This yields Deleuze’s 
understanding of ideal genesis, which involves at once an account of the origin of “actual terms and 
diverse real relations” and an account of the origin of those “differential elements and ideal 
connections” that precede and determine them.  The principle underlying both origins is that of a 
paradoxical structural becoming which realizes the concrete relations characteristic of a particular field 
on the basis of a prior “dialectic” of formal/structural relationships, in particular those of limit, 
unlimitedness, multiplicity and unity.   
In this essay, we will consider the formal and ontological implications of one specific and intensely 
contested dialectical context from which Deleuze’s thinking about structural ideal genesis visibly arises. 
This is the formal/ontological dualism between the principles, (ἀρχαί), of the One (ἕν) and the 
Indefinite/Unlimited Dyad (ἀόριστος δυάς), which is arguably the culminating achievement of the later 
Plato’s development of a mathematical dialectic.3  Following commentators including Lautman, Oskar 
Becker, and Kenneth M. Sayre, we argue that the duality of the One and the Indefinite Dyad provides, in 
the later Plato, a unitary theoretical formalism accounting, by means of an iterated mixing without 
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synthesis, for the structural origin and genesis of both supersensible Ideas and the sensible particulars 
which participate in them.  As these commentators also argue, the duality furthermore provides a 
maximally general answer to the problem of temporal becoming that runs through Plato’s corpus: that 
of the relationship of the flux of sensory experiences to the fixity and order of what is thinkable in itself.  
Additionally, it provides a basis for understanding some of the famously puzzling claims about forms, 
numbers, and the principled genesis of both attributed to Plato by Aristotle in the Metaphysics, and 
plausibly underlies the late Plato’s deep considerations of the structural paradoxes of temporal change 
and becoming in the Parmenides, the Sophist, and the Philebus.   
After extracting this structure of duality and developing some of its formal, ontological, and metalogical 
features, we consider some of its specific implications for a thinking of time and ideality that follows 
Deleuze in a formally unitary genetic understanding of structural difference.  These implications of 
Plato’s duality include not only those of the constitution of specific theoretical domains and 
problematics, but also implicate the reflexive problematic of the ideal determinants of the form of a 
unitary theory as such.  We argue that the consequences of the underlying duality on the level of 
content are ultimately such as to raise, on the level of form, the broader reflexive problem of the basis 
for its own formal or meta-theoretical employment.  We conclude by arguing for the decisive and 
substantive presence of a proper “Platonism” of the Idea in Deleuze, and weighing the potential for a 
substantive recuperation of Plato’s duality in the context of a dialectical affirmation of what Deleuze 
recognizes as the “only” ontological proposition that has ever been uttered. This is the proposition of 
the univocity of Being, whereby “being is said in the same sense, everywhere and always,” but is said 
(both problematically and decisively) of difference itself.   
1. Becoming and the Dyad: Deleuze’s Plato 
In the opening pages of The Logic of Sense, Deleuze considers the structure of a pure and paradoxical 
“becoming whose characteristic is to elude the present.”4  This becoming is exemplified, according to 
Deleuze, by the “pure events” of Alice’s transformations in Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland and 
Through the Looking-Glass.  It involves an “essence of becoming” through which it moves unlimitedly in 
both of two opposed directions at once, Alice becoming (for example) in the same moment both larger 
than she was and smaller than she becomes.  According to Deleuze, this paradoxical and bidirectional 
structure provides the formal basis for a theory of the conditioning of phenomena that, including their 
change and becoming at a fundamental level, does not relegate this conditioning to the static 
resemblance between a model and its copy.  As yielding such a theory of conditioning, the structure of 
paradoxical and unlimited becoming also helps to define an original structure of genesis, at the formal 
basis of the virtual which is the “characteristic state of Ideas.”5  Indeed, as Deleuze goes on to suggest, 
the structure of unlimited becoming is opposed, already in Plato, to the dimension of fixity, measure, 
and rest.   The two produce a profound and deep dualism at the root of Plato’s understanding of 
temporal genesis, one that is to be sharply distinguished from the more familiar “dualism” of the 
sensible and the supersensible: 
Plato invites us to distinguish two dimensions: (1) that of limited and measured things, of fixed 
qualities, permanent or temporary which always presuppose pauses and rests, the fixing of 
presents, and the assignation of subjects … and (2) a pure becoming without measure, a 
veritable becoming-mad, which never rests.  It moves in both directions at once.  It always 
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eludes the present, causing future and past, more and less, too much and not enough to 
coincide in the simultaneity of a rebellious matter.6  
Deleuze quotes briefly two passages in which this problematic becoming is evidenced in Plato’s 
dialogues, in connection with the problem of the relationship of temporal flux, change, and becoming, 
limitless in itself, to whatever fixes quantities and gives order.  The first of these is Socrates’ example in 
the Philebus (24b-d) of the hotter and the colder, which cannot (as Socrates argues) “take on a definite 
quality” since, as they are always “going a point further,” cannot stop and become fixed without 
becoming something other than themselves.  This requires, according to Socrates, that both the hotter 
and its opposite be characterized under the heading of the “unlimited” (ἄπειρον), as against that which 
is characterized, by contrast, by “limit,” (πέρας) in the course of drawing a distinction among everything 
that is into these two types, along with their mixture and its cause, the principle of which is established 
earlier in the dialogue as one suggested or given by the gods.  The other example comes in the 
Parmenides, in the course of the development of the implications of the second hypothesis about the 
One, and in particular the consequences of its partaking in time.  According to this hypothesis, 
Parmenides suggests, the One will be characterized by “coming-to-be both older and younger, and 
neither older nor younger, than the others and they than it.”  (154a).  By virtue of this becoming, 
according to Parmenides, both younger and older go “toward their opposites… the younger coming to 
be older than the older, and the older younger than the younger…” though neither, again, can actually 
attain a fixed relationship to the other, since then they would cease becoming and no longer come to be 
anything at all.   
In thus evoking the duality between a dyadic principle of unlimited becoming, on one hand, and the 
fixity of limit, on the other, Plato thus points, according to Deleuze, to a “more profound and secret 
dualism hidden in sensible and material bodies themselves,” one that does not characterize the 
distinction between the “intelligible and the sensible,” between “Idea and matter” or between “Ideas 
and bodies.”7  Rather, it is a dualism between “that which receives the action of the Idea and that which 
eludes this action,” according to which, while “limited things lie beneath the Ideas,” there is 
nevertheless still “even beneath things…[a] mad element which subsists and occurs on the other side of 
the order that Ideas impose and things receive.”8  This Platonic dualism between (on the one hand) what 
Plato characterizes as the One or Unity and (on the other) an irreducibly dyadic principle of the 
unlimited, further characterized as that of the “Great and the Small” thus offers, on Deleuze’s reading, a 
general structural framework for accounting not only for the relationship of “participation” between 
sensible things and Ideas, but even for the very constitution of both on the basis of the deeper structural 
and dialectical relationships it formulates.   
It is the same Platonic dualism which, as modern scholarship has demonstrated, plausibly underlies 
some of the puzzling views about forms and numbers attributed elliptically to Plato by Aristotle in the 
course of his doxography of earlier principles in the Metaphysics:   
Since the Forms are the causes of all other things, [Plato] thought their elements were the 
elements of all things.  As matter, the great and the small were principles; as substance, the 
One; for from the great and the small, by participation in the One, come the Forms, i.e. the 
numbers. 
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But he agreed with the Pythagoreans in saying that the One is substance and not a predicate of 
something else; and in saying that the numbers are the causes of the substance of other things, 
he also agreed with them; but positing a dyad and constructing the infinite out of great and 
small, instead of treating the infinite as one, is peculiar to him; and so is his view that the 
numbers exist apart from sensible things, while they say that the things themselves are 
numbers, and do not place the objects of mathematics between Forms and sensible things.  His 
divergence from the Pythagoreans in making the One and the numbers separate from things, 
and his introduction of the Forms, were due to his inquiries in the region of definatory formulae 
(for the earlier thinkers had no tincture of dialectic), and his making the other entity besides the 
One a dyad was due to the belief that the numbers, except those which were prime, could be 
neatly produced out of the dyad as out of a plastic material.9  
In this passage and others, Aristotle attributes several deeply puzzling claims to Plato.  These include the 
claims that Forms have elements which are also the elements “of all things”, that numbers can be 
“produced out” of the dyad of the Great and Small, which acts as a kind of “material” in combination 
with the One, and that forms actually are themselves to be identified with numbers as thus produced.  
Aristotle appears also to claim that Plato held that sensible objects are constituted of forms and the 
Great and the Small, and that forms are themselves composed of the Great and the Small together with 
Unity.10  Aristotle says directly in several places that Plato identified forms with numbers.11  He also 
makes the suggestions that Plato identifies Unity with the Good (and perhaps that he identifies the 
Great and the Small, by contrast, with evil), and that Plato treats the “Great and Small” as matter with 
respect to which the One is form.12   
Beyond Aristotle’s testimony, there is evidence that the development of the problem of number may be 
closely connected with the content of what have been called Plato’s “unwritten” teachings.13  The sixth-
century Neoplatonist Simplicius notoriously reports descriptions of a lecture given by Plato on the Good 
and attended by Aristotle and others: Aristotle is said to have reported Plato’s teaching that the 
principles of all things, including the Ideas, are the “Indefinite Dyad, which is called Great and Small” and 
Unity.14  There is a suggestion in Simplicius’s quotations of Poryphry and Alexander that Plato had held 
that Unity and the Indefinite Dyad are also the elements of numbers and that each of the numbers 
participates in these two principles.15  The lecture on the Good is said by Aristotle’s student Aristoxenus 
to have confounded Plato’s listeners, who expected a lecture on ethics but were instead treated to a 
discussion of numbers and geometry, leading up to the claim that the Good is to be identified with Unity 
or “the One”.16  In Platonic scholarship, the attempt to explicate the exact nature and systematic role of 
the teachings of Plato that can be summarized under the heading of the duality of the ἀρχαί of the 
One/Good and the indefinite dyad, or the greater-and-less have led to a wide variety of exegetical and 
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substantive accounts.17  Many of these accounts have attempted, as well, to explain why these 
apparently crucial teachings do not appear in a direct form in any of Plato’s dialogues, characterizing 
them, for instance, as Plato’s “oral” or “inner-Academic” teachings, or emphasizing what is seen as their 
intrinsic connection to a dialogical form of life, which for various reasons cannot be directly represented 
or replicated in writing.  Here, without taking a position on this question of the “unwrittenness” of the 
theory of duality, we will simply attempt to reconstruct its probable logical form, following in particular 
modern commentators who discover evidence for it in the dialogues themselves.   
 
In particular, it will be useful to consider the interpretations of the doctrine of duality which arise in the 
twentieth century from two rather disparate lines of scholarship.  One of these lines, arising from Julius 
Stenzel and passing through Oskar Becker, culminates in Lautman’s reconstruction of the ideal genesis 
of numbers and ideas on the basis of a “superior” dialectic of virtual relations.  It is this line which, as we 
have already seen, most directly influences Deleuze in his conception of ideal genesis on the level of the 
virtual.  But another strand, largely or wholly distinct from the first but just as useful for understanding 
the probable logical form of Plato’s doctrine, is inaugurated in recent “analytic” scholarship by Kenneth 
M. Sayre’s interpretation of the so-called “unwritten teachings” as, in fact, literally written in several of 
the late dialogues, and explicable on the direct basis of the mathematical theories and leading problems 
already known to Plato. 
2. The Principles in the Twentieth Century: Stenzel, Becker, Lautman, and Sayre  
In his 1927 work Mathematical Existence, Oskar Becker, following Julius Stenzel, theorizes the role of the 
ἄπειρον, as it figures specifically in the “unlimited Dyad” (ἀόριστος δυάς), as that of a kind of generative 
potency, at the root of both the existence of “number” and its “generation” in accordance with a 
temporal or quasi-temporal anteriority to produce an ordering of before and after.  Becker suggests that 
this ordering is subsequently crucial for Aristotle’s conception of the infinite, and in particular for its 
close relationship to his account of time in the Physics, according to which time is a counting or 
numbering of motion, with respect to just this distinction of “before and after.”  Here, Becker suggests, 
the thought of time as the continuity of the ἄπειρον, prior to and before the possibility of measurement, 
has a deeper provenance in the linked conception of time and number already appears in the somewhat 
obscure Platonic conception of the dyad.18  In a later (1931) article “The Diairetic Generation of Platonic 
Ideal Numbers,”   Becker, developing suggestions made initially by Stenzel, argues that the generation of 
numbers can be considered, in close connection with the method of “diaeresis” or division 
recommended by Plato in a number of late dialogues, actually identical to that of the diairetic definition 
of a concept by division.  Stenzel had suggested, in particular, that the positive whole numbers may be 
seen as generated by means of a process of successive binary “division,” whereby each number n, 
beginning with 1, generates 2n and 2n+1.  According to Becker, although this solution tends in the right 
direction, it does not explain how “ideal” (as opposed to familiar mathematical) numbers can actually be 
ideas, and it also does not explain how ideas can thereby be thought as dynamically generated rather 
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than simply recovered subsequently by analysis.  As an alternative, he suggests that the ideal numbers 
are generated by a repeated process whereby one divides into two, but in the division the original one is 
“sublated” or overcome in the division.  In this way, the powers of 2 (2, 4, 8, 16, etc.) can be thought of 
as generated by the symmetrical iteration of binary division itself, while all other numbers are seen as 
arising from an asymmetrical development of a diairetic tree structure (e.g. 3 is generated by the 
division of an initial unit, a, into two, (b and c) and the subsequent division of c into d and e, while b 
remains unaffected; the remaining (unsublated) elements are then three (b, d, and e).)  In this way, the 
actual seriality of number can be seen as generated in a way that is “formally identical” to the structure 
of the diairesis of concepts that Plato suggests in the Sophist and the Statesman. Becker also notes the 
possibility of connecting this to the structure of the division of a continuous quantity by iterated 
fractional decomposition to produce an exact (rational) point.  In this way, the process of diairesis which 
results in the identification of the constituents of an idea as “monads” or “ones” may be thought to 
produce examples of the sort that Plato appeals to in the Philebus, e.g. the identification of the fixed 
letters or discrete musical notes from the fluid continuum of possible sounds.  
 
Albert Lautman’s 1939 work, “New Research on the Dialectical Structure of Mathematics,” draws on the 
thesis of his 1938 dissertation, according to which concrete mathematical theories develop a series of 
“ideal relations” of a “dialectic abstract and superior to mathematics.”19  In particular, Lautman 
understands abstract “dialectical” ideas as the development of the possibility of relations between what 
he calls (by contrast) pairs of notions: these are pairs such as those of “whole and part, situational 
properties and intrinsic properties, basic domains and the entities defined on these domains, formal 
systems and their realization, etc.”20  The dialectical ideas that pose these relations do not presuppose 
the existence of specific mathematical domains or objects. Rather, they operate, in the course of 
mathematical research, essentially as “problems” or “posed questions” that provide the occasion for 
inquiry into specific mathematical existents.  In reference to differing specific mathematical theories 
such as, for instance, the theory of sets or (in a different way) real analysis, the dialectical relationship of 
whole and part may be seen as posing a general problem which is to be resolved differently in each 
domain, on the basis of concrete mathematical research, and thereby partially determines the kind and 
structure of entities existing in that particular domain.  Thus general problems such as the problem of 
the relationship of formal theories of proof to actual mathematical results, the relationship of whole to 
part, and (especially) the relationship of continuity and discontinuity pose conditions under which they 
are resolved concretely, in different ways, in specific mathematical theories. At the same time, the 
development of the specific theories in terms of the particular kinds of structures and entities said to 
exist therein points back to the general problem and articulates its own more general structure.   
 
The problem, here, thus has a priority over its particular solutions, and cannot be reduced to them.  
According to Lautman, this priority is not that of an ideality existent in itself prior to its incarnation in a 
specific domain, but rather that of the kind of problematic “advent of notions relative to the concrete 
within an analysis of the Idea.”21 In particular, it is only in developing the actual structure and 
configuration of particular concrete domains, that the actual meaning of the governing Ideas is worked 
out.  Here the concrete development of particular domains does not, moreover, exhaust the general 
problem but rather, typically, suggests new questions and problems in other concrete domains which 
are also to be related to the same general dialectical structure.  Dialectical Ideas, in this sense,  “govern” 
the “intrinsic reality” of mathematical objects and it can even be said, using the Platonic terminology, 
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that the reality of the mathematical objects, as concretely demonstrated in mathematical research, thus 
resides in their “participation” in the dialectical ideas.22   But as Lautman emphasizes, this sense of 
“participation” is quite at odds with the way Plato’s conception of participation is typically understood.  
In particular, whereas participation is often understood as that of an ideal model to objects which in 
some respect copy them, here the Ideas are understood “in the true Platonic sense of the term” as the 
“structural schemas according to which the effective theories are organized.”23  What is at issue here is 
not a “cosmological sense” of the relationship between ideas and their concrete realization such as is 
developed, for instance, in the Timeaus.  According to such a sense, which is fundamentally understood 
by reference to the concept of creation as forming or shaping, the realization of the ideas in concrete 
reality depends on their capacity to impose law and structure on an otherwise undifferentiated matter, 
itself knowable only (as Plato in fact suggests) by a kind of “bastard reasoning” or “natural revelation.”24 
By contrast with this “cosmological sense” of the relationship between ideas and particulars, it is 
essential in the case of mathematical objectivity to understand the relationship between the dialectical 
ideas and the particular mathematical objects as a “cut [which] cannot in fact be envisaged.” This is, 
Lautman says, a kind of “mode of emanation” from dialectics to mathematics that does not in any way 
presuppose the “contingent imposition of a Matter heterogeneous to the Ideas.”25  
 
For Lautman, many of the problems that define the “superior” dialectic that ultimately determines 
specific mathematical domains and their essential problems are evident in the historical concerns of 
philosophers, for instance with the relationships between the “same and the other, the whole and the 
part, the continuous and the discontinuous, essence and existence.”26  But the mathematician’s activity 
has an equally significant role, according to Lautman, in giving rise to new problems that have not yet 
been abstractly formulated.  In this twofold enterprise, the task is thus not to demonstrate the 
applicability of classical logical or metaphysical problems within mathematical theories, but rather to 
grasp the structure of such theories “globally in order to identify the logical problem that happens to be 
both defined and resolved” by its existence.27  This is a peculiar experience of thought, according to 
Lautman, equally characteristic of the capacity of the intelligence to create as of its capacity to 
understand.  In it,  
 
Beyond the temporal conditions of mathematical activity, but within the very bosom of this 
activity, appear the contours of an ideal reality that is governing with respect to a mathematical 
matter which it animates, and which however, without that matter, could not reveal all the 
richness of its formative power.28   
 
Finally, Lautman suggests that this particular experience of exigency, by means of which general 
philosophical problems communicate with the particular constraints of specific mathematical domains 
to illuminate the “contours” of such a superior reality, can be witnessed in the late Plato’s 
understanding of the genesis of Ideas and numbers:  
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All modern Plato commentators … insist on the fact that the Ideas are not immobile and 
irreducible essences of an intelligible world, but that they are related to each other according to 
the schemas of a superior dialectic that presides over their arrival.  The work of Robin, Stenzel 
and Becker has in this regard brought considerable clarity to the governing role of Ideas-
numbers which concerns as much the becoming of numbers as that of Ideas.  The One and the 
Dyad generate Ideas-numbers by a successively repeated process of division of the Unit into two 
new units.  The Ideas-numbers are thus presented as geometric schemas of the combinations of 
units, amenable to constituting arithmetic numbers as well as Ideas in the ordinary sense.29 
 
Following Stenzel and Becker, Lautman suggests that the diaeretic “schemas of division” of Ideas in the 
Sophist can themselves be traced, in their logical structure, to the schemas of the “combination of units” 
that are also responsible for the generation of the ideas-numbers.  Both are then genetically dependent 
upon a kind of “metamathematics” which unfolds a time of generation that, though it is not “in the time 
of the created world” is nevertheless, just as much, ordered according to anteriority and posteriority.30  
This ordering according to anteriority and posteriority is equally determinative, and even in the same 
sense, with respect to essences quite generally as with respect to numbers themselves.  Indeed, 
following a suggestion by Stenzel, Lautman suggests that this is the significance of Aristotle’s claim in the 
Nicomachean Ethics (1.4) that the Platonists did not admit the ideas of numbers.  Since the ideal-
numbers are already the principle of the determination of essences as anterior and posterior (i.e. as 
before and after), there is not (nor can there be) a further principle of the division of essences that is 
prior to or superior to this numerical division itself.  In this impossibility of equipping the 
metamathematics of the ideal-numerical principles of anteriority and posteriority with another 
determination (a “metametamathematics”, so to speak), we witness once again, according to Lautman, 
the necessity of pursuing the dialectic in which the mathematical problems and the ideal relations 
communicate with and articulate one another.31  In particular, in such a dialectic, and only in it, are to be 
found the problematic conditions and the possibility of mutual illumination in which the more original 
structures constitutive of anteriority and posteriority as such – and hence of time and genesis, in an 
original sense – can be brought to light.   
 
In a remarkable analysis, Kenneth M. Sayre has argued that the content of the so-called “unwritten 
teachings” that link the problems of number with those of the structure of forms and the Good can be 
largely recovered from Plato’s middle and late dialogues themselves.  According to Sayre, it is thus not 
necessary to speculate about the esoteric content of the Platonic teachings alluded to by Aristotle, since 
they are actually present in dialogues such as the Philebus, Parmenides, and Sophist (among others).    
Sayre reconstructs Aristotle’s statements as clearly attributing five distinct claims about forms, sensible 
objects, numbers, and the Great and the Small.  Among these are the claims that sensible objects are 
constituted of forms and the Great and the Small, and that forms are themselves composed of the Great 
and the Small and Unity.32  As Sayre notes, while the claim that the forms are the principles or causes of 
sensible things is familiar from many of Plato’s dialogues and is present as early as the Phaedo, the 
suggestion of a composition of the forms themselves by more basic principles would be, if it can be 
attributed to him, a significantly novel element of the late Plato’s final thinking about them.  Sayre sees 
this late conception as developed both thematically and methodologically in Plato’s descriptions of the 
method of dialectic in the Sophist, the Statesman, and especially the Philebus, where at 16c-e,  Socrates 
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describes a “god-given” method for pursuing problems of the one and the many generally, including (it 
appears) with respect to the distinctive unity exhibited by forms.  On Sayre’s reading, the passage is 
meant to formulate a methodological response to the question of how the kind of unity (monadas) that 
a form is can characterize indefinitely many changing particulars, without thereby becoming dispersed 
among them and losing its unity.  The problem is a specification of the more general question of how the 
properties and characteristics of individuals are thinkable at all, given that they are subject to ceaseless 
change in time.   
 
Thus specified, the problem does not simply involve the unity of forms as such, over against sensible 
beings thought as completely undifferentiated or irreducibly multiple.  Rather, since it is also the 
question of how sensible things are themselves thinkable as enduring unities despite the unlimitedness 
of their possible change, its solution involves a unified accounting for the unity of both.  Since sensory 
objects would, if (somehow) deprived of the relationship to Forms that allow them to be thought as 
distinct individuals having definite characteristics, also have no definite character and in this sense be 
indistinguishable from the ἄπειρον, the problem is that of characterizing how determinate forms are 
themselves defined and gain application to the changing particulars.33 The elements of a solution to this 
are to be found, Sayre suggests, in the Philebus’ development of cases (17a-e) in which a number of 
specific characteristics are distinguished out of a continuum of possible variation, such as the 
identification of particular letters from the continuum of vocables, or the identification of discrete 
musical notes from the continuum of sound.34  In this way, a particular discrete number of intermediate 
forms are introduced between the general and continuous form (for instance sound itself) and the 
specific instances, for which the intermediate forms then serve as measures.35 
 
As Sayre suggests, the methodology may be considered a further development of the method of the 
collection or division (or synthesis and diaeresis) proposed in the Statesman and the Sophist.  As is 
suggested there, the key methodological idea is that the definition of a thing begins by collecting a 
number of instances of the kind to be defined with a view to discerning the general form they have in 
common.  The form, once found, is further articulated or qualified by a repeated diaeresis or division of 
its several components, until a unique set of specific characteristics is identified that distinguish the 
particular kind of thing in question from others similar to it.  As Sayre notes, however, the major and 
glaring difference between the description of the “god-given” method in the Philebus and the 
descriptions of the dialectician’s art in the Sophist and the Statesman is that the latter two involve no 
mention either of the ἄπειρον, or of the need to distinguish among indefinitely many single things to 
articulate what is in itself a continuum having the character of the “unlimited” in the sense of 
indefiniteness.  Sayre sees the account given in the Philebus as responding to a problem about unity and 
the ἄπειρον – both in the sense of the “indefinitely many” and that of the indefinitely continuous -- that 
is already posed in the Parmenides at 157b-158b.  The idea of a unified collection of individual members, 
or a whole composed of parts, involves both that there is a sense of unity characteristic of the collection 
as a whole and that there is a sense of unity characteristic of each member as a unique individual.  Unity 
in both senses must be imposed on what is in itself non-unified in order to produce the determinate 
structure of whole and part.36  The possibility of identifying an individual as part of such a collection 
must thus result from the combination of a principle of Unity, in both senses, with a contrasting 
principle of the indefinitely many or multitudinous.  This is what Plato calls in the Parmenides the 
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apeiron plethos and which, Sayre suggests, can also be identified with the (later) mentions of the 
“indefinite dyad” or, indeed, the “Great and the Small” of which Aristotle speaks.   
 
On this basis, Sayre can argue that the final Philebus account of forms and participation involves a 
twofold application of the imposition of Unity on the Great and Small: first, in order to produce the 
determinate forms themselves, and second, in the imposition of the forms thus produced, now 
functioning as “measures”, on the Great and Small again to produce the characteristics of particular 
sensible objects.37  If this is right, both the Forms and sensible things are composed from the two 
principles, although according to different modes of combination.  This suggestion of a unitary genesis 
ultimately underlying both the forms and their sensory participants allows Sayre to contest both of two 
conflicting readings of the role of the πέρας and the ἄπειρον in the Philebus.  On the first of these, the 
relationship between limit and the unlimited is analogous to or anticipatory of Aristotle’s account of 
form and matter; here, the unlimited is accordingly said to be a kind of undetermined potentiality of 
objects to acquire certain properties.38  On the second existing view, the “unlimited” is not attributed 
directly to objects at all, but is rather a set of concepts which admit of variation as less or more.39  Sayre 
argues that both views have potentially fatal internal problems.  The first, in particular, has difficulty 
explaining why the imposition of Unity should produce particular objects that are in some sense valued 
as ordered as opposed to bad or disordered elements corresponding to other points on the same 
continuum.  But the second has difficulty explaining how the mixing of Unity and the Indefinite could 
produce determinate individuals and not simply determinate types.  Both existing alternatives, Sayre 
argues, are furthermore difficult to square with the text.  A better alternative is to construe the 
combination of Unity with the ἄπειρον as having the twofold application, both to the generation of 
forms and, once again, to the specification of particular objects, that Aristotle also suggests in his own 
gloss on Plato’s theory of forms and numbers.  In each case, the combination allows for determinate 
measure to be imposed upon what would otherwise be the ἄπειρον character of what would become or 
change indefinitely and without limit. 
3. The Structure of Plato’s Duality 
As we have seen, the dualism of the One and the Unlimited Dyad, if indeed it can be attributed to Plato 
and has roughly the structure that Stenzel, Becker, Lautman, and Sayre suggest, plausibly underlies a 
uniform Platonic account of ideal structural genesis.  According to this account, both ideas and their 
participants, and even the underlying structure of their becoming in the “now”, have their genesis in the 
interaction of the two “principles” (ἀρχαί) of the dualism. This raises the pressing question of the 
relationship of this “two” to the “one” of being which Deleuze affirms as the univocity of being, and 
relates to his ontology of difference. To address this question on the level of a formal and meta-formal 
analysis, we will first briefly underline several structural features that constrain the interpretation of 
Platonic dualism as we have reconstructed it here, following the contemporary commentators.   
Plato’s dualism, which is literally a dualism of the One and the Two, is a dualism of a radical and 
unfamiliar kind, as can be brought out by contrasting its structure with that of some more familiar 
ontological proposals. First, it is not a dualism of substances or types of entities. Neither is it the “two-
worlds” dualism of vulgar Platonism (and vulgar anti-Platonism), which stop with the first distinction 
between a  form and its sensible participant without pushing on, as Plato’s dualism does, to the question 
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of the ground of the identity and difference of the two terms that are thereby related.  Again, given its 
structure, Plato’s duality cannot be understood as the duality of two mutually complementary parts 
within a larger given whole, or of an opposition of forces which could, even in principle, be reconciled or 
reinscribed into a larger unity. (It may be that it can, however, be understood as the affirmation of the 
impossibility a priori of such a final synthesis, a point to which we will return.)  
Both familiar dualisms, and even familiar cases of duality, consist in pointing out two things: two types 
of things in the case of dualism, two complementary parts of something in the case of intratheoretical 
dualities. Plato complicates this in perhaps the most decisive way possible in a single move. The “two” 
that he asks about are the two consisting (first) of the one and (second) of the two.  This “second,” 
moreover, is itself irreducibly dual: paradoxically split, in a way that affirms unlimited becoming in both 
of two opposed directions, and can thus in itself find no stopping point, on pain of not being what it is.  
This is sufficient to ensure that, even if the two “principles” of the one and the dyad are thought 
together, the thought will itself be irreducibly dual and dualizing.  Rather than inscribe them within a 
single static field, or subsume them to the principle or possibility of a higher reconciliation, their work, if 
they really are ἀρχαί, will include a rebound upon the discourse and even the thought that, naming 
them, claims to get a synoptic view of them.  Whether this application of the Two to its own thought 
ruins the possibility that any articulable dualism can be true or any true dualism articulable, is a question 
to which we will return (in a twofold way) in the final section.  
At the same time, and for the same reason, the inscription of the One as one element of the dyad in the 
Platonic dualism does not in any way indicate an incipient or approximate monism of the One.  If the 
Platonic dualism indeed affirms the possibility of a uniform accounting for both being and becoming, it is 
not because it reduces the two to any given one.  It is rather essential to its structure that it affirm an 
irreducible basis for both in the two principles it introduces, without any possible reduction of their 
difference, and it is in this way that it plausibly witnesses Plato’s final overcoming of Eleaticism, while 
also subverting in advance any neo-Platonic reduction to the One.  Indeed, because of (what we might 
call) the irreducibly “dyadic” character of the dyad, there is no possible deduction or derivation of it 
from the contrasting principle of the One.  And although, as is witnessed in the complex dialectics of the 
Parmenides, the idea of an irreducible alterity may yield a profound sense of the difference, the duality 
that is at stake here is not simply the opposition of the One and the Other(s). In treating the dyad as a 
principle opposed to the One, Plato articulates a more structurally complex configuration of relationality 
in which any relativity of the other(s) to the One, if it is not to lead to a false correlation of the two, must 
be redoubled with an incommensurable counter-correlativity from the side of the Dyad.40   
Thus by contrast with, for instance, the Aristotelian relativity of matter to form, or the 
Schellingian/Hegelian “identity of identity and difference,” here, through the very dyadic character of 
the dyad, the dualism of the One and what is other to it is in no way overcome, suppressed, reduced or 
sublated by the assumption of an existing One-All.  Rather than being overcome in such a way, dualism 
is rather apportioned, continually rediscovered, and deployed more aggressively, not only on the 
“ontological” level of entities but also on the level of the very logic of the account which systematically 
inscribes it in the structure of what is, without tacitly reinscribing it within a single total and consistent 
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system.  Here, what Hegel identifies as the flaw of indeterminate negation is seen to be rather the form 
in which truth of duality as final: the relation by which an opposed A and B can be fixed and projected 
into a synthetic AB turns out to be merely an AB in the sense of A or an AB in the sense of B.41   
Because of the formal level on which the dualism operates, viz., not only intratheoretically, but 
metatheoretically, it is such as to split not only the ontological field to which it is applied, but also the 
theoretical position from which it finds any possible application.  In this respect it reflexively takes itself 
up within its own scope, inscribing an irreducible two not only on the level of the principles grounding  
being and becoming, but also (as a “metalogical” or “metaformal” duality between completeness and 
consistency) on the level of any possible application of principles to being and the norms that govern 
it.42   
In particular, if “two” here is not just the quantity of the principles, as in Aristotle's doxography, but the 
very essence of a split ἀρχή,  then any argument for limiting the possibilities of knowledge's access to 
principles as such, which does not make essential use of the duality, risks missing the intrinsic logic of 
the topic.  Thus, one can emphasize completeness, underscoring that the two together generate all 
things.  This produces a total system, which happens to rest on two principles. But this would simply be 
another theory of everything, as though instead of a one-all, we had here simply a two-all.  This is the 
line of many who refer to ideal genesis, including, for instance, many of those who follow the 
“systematic” reconstructions of the Tübingen school.  And it is also, of course, a tendency of Plato’s 
thought.43 But the difference from monism is then only momentary and superficial, and nothing is easier 
than for improvers of the system, beginning with Neoplatonism, to repair lapsed monism by 
representing multiplicity and its disasters, the very stuff of existence according to the dualist account, as 
merely privative.  Or one can emphasize consistency, pointing to how the “two” of the dualism together 
provide, in any concrete case, a coherent account of the determinate being of a thing.  But this is to 
ignore or deny the inconsistency inherent to its becoming, its tendency to overleap boundaries and 
subvert identities through the continuity of its potentially limitless change in both directions, and thus to 
communicate directly, in the most banal of its changes, with infinite multiplicities that exceed the 
resources of a given consistent theory.  Beyond either of these strategies, what is necessary to grasp the 
reflexive bearing of the Platonic duality on the very structure of ἀρχή as such is, rather, to emphasize its 
tangled and iterative structure, whereby the one is doubled by its other only in order for any unity of the 
two to be split once more, and in unlimited fashion.  A radically dualist ontology of the Platonic sort, 
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then, can only be maintained with a shift in the ontological function of knowledge.  The task of ontology 
no longer takes the form of a progressive completion of a One-All, or a filling in the gaps of a total 
account of all the beings that is in itself capable of both completeness and consistency.   Rather, the one 
and the all are simultaneously present to us, not as starting points for a deductive or genetic chain 
whose existence would tacitly neutralize their ontological potential, but as norms of theoretical 
construction.  It is then only the reflective acknowledgement of a failure, at once mathematical and 
philosophical, to realize them simultaneously that leads us to posit the irreducibility of the dyad as what 
there must have been, such that the projected synthesis of consistency and completeness absolutely is 
not.  
This makes possible a kind of dialectical analysis which has a wholly different tendency from Aristotelian 
essentialism, insofar as it inscribes in place of any harmonious unity between thought and being in 
adequate knowledge rather an irreducible conflict of the norms of completeness and consistency.  This 
is a conflict which indeed plays itself out immanently in knowledge, allowing it thereby to participate 
essentially in the duality of the principles itself.  The metalogical or metaformal theory that results, as 
much as it remains a theory of the ἀρχή, shares as many characteristics with an an-archy.  If the One, in 
its duality, is here still identified with the Good, then Platonic dualism structurally demands a conversion 
which would here separate the Good from the ideal of the Perfect, blocking any possible ontotheology. 
4. Univocity and Dualism: Ontological Questions 
How, then, does Plato’s irreducible “two” stand with respect to what Deleuze affirms, early in Difference 
and Repetition, as the only possible ontological proposition and finds at the basis of any possible 
formal/ontological articulation of the irreducibility of difference, the proposition that Being is said in a 
single sense?  On this point, we conclude by offering two distinct suggestions, whose compatibility is 
itself a difficult question, and which arise from the overlapping but different perspectives of the two 
present authors.   
First suggestion: Deleuzian side 
If the univocity of being – the single sense of its saying -- were indeed thought here as an ontic first 
principle or an undivided ἀρχή, it would indeed deny or restrict the duality of the Platonic “two.”  It 
would re-inscribe them within a logic of simultaneous completeness and consistency, and vitiate the 
iterated difference in which the duality maintains itself, as we have argued, in being applied to itself 
along with whatever is and becomes.  But in order to reconcile the univocity of being with the original 
duality at the ontological and metalogical basis of ideal genesis, and thereby distinguish it completely 
from any principle of ontological monism, it may be sufficient to recall the specification which Deleuze 
immediately gives it.  This is the specification that, though being is said in one and the same sense, that 
of which it is said is nothing other than difference itself.   
More specifically, Deleuze writes, “In effect, the essential in univocity is not that Being is said in a single 
and same sense, but that it is said, in a single and same sense, of all its individuating differences or 
intrinsic modalities.”44 The several “formally distinct senses” which articulate these differences or 
modalities of difference are, at the same time, univocally affirmed and said in the same way, in terms of 
a being “equal” for all.  In briefly tracing the history of the univocity of being, Deleuze finds that Scotus 
affirms it as being’s  neutrality with respect to the distinction of its finite and infinite modalities, while 
Spinoza does so by affirming unitary substance as distinct from the modes, and Nietzsche by affirming 
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the repetition in which only difference returns.45  Each one thereby avoids an onto-theological 
unification of beings into the totality of a One-All, but only by affirming instead an irreducible duality or 
multiplicity of the ἀρχή itself, on the level of principles or of the differentiating modes of that of which 
univocal being is said.  But if the ontological proposition of the univocity of being thus does not 
contravene, in each of these cases, the equal affirmation of an irreducibly split doctrine of determining 
modes, then maybe all that is needed to affirm a parallel separation, and thus to recover a Plato beyond 
or before the onto-theological closure, is to remove the priority marked in Plato’s own thought by his 
identification of Unity with the good, and flatten the hierarchy it implies.  To do this would be, instead of 
Plato’s own preference for the One over the dyad, to hold the “two” of the Platonic duality rigorously 
equal and their priority undecidable, thereby affirming the equal right and power of the two with 
respect to the ideal and real genesis they effect.   
Second suggestion: Platonic side.  
The reflexive problem of the split application of the duality to itself must be given its due if it is to be 
answered satisfactorily.  What can it mean to give one theory that holds it to be true and articulable that 
there are two ultimate principles, two ἀρχαί? There is a strong prima facie case that any such theory 
refutes itself, and this has led to a widespread prejudice against dualism in contemporary thought. For 
Plato’s logic of the “one-over-many” does not seem to stop at the terms of any known duality. In order 
to say that there are two of something, we seem to need to make essential use of a unity which 
precedes and surpasses the duality. This poses no problem when speaking of, say, two cows. But when, 
in order to say that there are two ἀρχαί, it appears that we must appeal to a single univocal concept of 
ἀρχή, we seem to approach a destructive interference of form and content. For, if we are in possession 
of such a concept, we can take it, in correspondence with the entirety of its extension, to be the higher 
genus which is the proper object of our philosophical attention. Thus the conditions for the articulation 
of a duality of ἀρχαί seem to be incompatible with its truth, and it appears that a dualist theory must be 
either meaningless or self-refuting.  
This relentless reassertion of totality in and by means of theory may indeed characterize any conceivable 
strictly intratheoretical dualities, and the way in which such dualities, however stark, tend to reinforce 
the one-all of the theory in which they appear. For this reason, it is important to emphasize the 
metalogical character of the duality of ἀρχαί. This theory, if true, shares the essential characteristic of 
formal theories with the expressive power of arithmetic: the one-all that seems demanded to make 
their questions sensible is subverted by the answers those questions receive. The objection to dualism 
can then be reversed and taken as a criterion of adequacy. If we take a dualism of ἀρχαί seriously, 
ontologically and logically, then at some point that thesis, which seems to rest on our possession of a 
prior concept of ἀρχή, has to step out of order and retroactively split that concept itself. The duality of 
the ἀρχαί must retroact upon the concept of ἀρχή in a logical experience which, if it is to output the 
dyad, can only be negative, that is, the experience of the impossibility, a priori, of their synthesis.  
The unity of the ἀρχή that we need in order to ask the ontological question is then only the unity of the 
problem – specifically, a problem about synthesizing the norms which appear ontologically as the one 
and the dyad, and metatheoretically as consistency and completeness. Metalogical difference or 
metalogical duality thus depends essentially on metalogical negation, and vice versa. This negation is 
ontologically affirmative, not in the manner of the extension of a concept, but in that of the truth of a 
theorem.    
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Lautman and Deleuze have taken some of the first steps toward such an ontological recognition of what 
metamathematics shows us, and have done so, crucially, in terms of an experience of the difference 
between problem and solution. However, the price of selecting this point of interface is that it may be 
necessary to curtail Deleuze’s tendency, in suggesting that the One is only the univocity of difference, to 
project univocity beyond the threshold of the question or problem, celebrating rather the affirmation of 
difference as such and in itself.  Along similar lines, it would apparently also be necessary to reconsider 
whether Deleuze, in dealing theory the power thus to decide between affirmation and negation, tends 
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